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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR ROWLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

GRA YEN BROTHERS &
COMPANY, INC., aka GRAVEN
COMPANY,

12384

Defendant-Respondent.

MOTION FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff-Appellant, through his attorneys, King &
Craft, moves the court grant him a rehearing and modify
its opinion of December 14, 1971, pursuant to Rule 76
(e) ( I ) , URCP, to allow him a new trial.
To conform to the Supreme Court's opinion, appellant will be referred to as plaintiff, and respondent as
defendant.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in this case is
properly written for the facts it recites. However, if
1

those were the correct facts, there would have been no
appeal. Plaintiff's counsel in their -1<2-page brief seem to
have mastered the art of verbosity, but not the art of
clarity.
Point I, the major point of the appeal, was proximate cause. Under the facts given in the opinion, it is not
in issue. This illustrates the degree by which there is a '
misunderstanding. No matter how well the law might be
stated in an opinion, if it fails to fit the facts, it misses
the point.
The case is an important one to plaintiff. The court
is not asked to make bad law of a hard case. It is asked,
though, to carefully reconsider the facts, and then reconsider the opinion, as it is the court of last resort in
this case.
The opinion states that a new trial is to be given
only if error is of such importance, "that there is a reasonable likelihood to belieYe that in its absence there
would have been a result more favorable to him." Plain·
tiff accepts this burden.

To refresh quickly on the facts, and the contentions
of the parties, defendant had pipe in its Flagstaff, Ari·
zona ,yard that it wanted in its Salt Lake City yard.
Plaintiff, a trucker and independent contractor, trans·
ported the pipe. In transit, the pipes were held in place
by chains. During unloading, the pipes had to be held in !
place by blocks. If not, the pipes would be loose and free '
to roll when the final chain, the belly wrap, was undone.
1

2

Plaintiff alleged that the accepted customs and
duties in the trade during unloading were developed on
the common-sense basis of each party handling the property with which he was concerned. The trucker owns the
chains. He releases them and stows them away. The yard
owns the blocks and the load, and knows where it wants
the blocks and load stored, so it handles them. This involves a degree of teamwork, as each party should do its
part of the job at the right time as the work progresses.
Plaintiff's claim against defendant was a single pointthat defendant breached its duty to properly block the
pipe, so that when plaintiff undid the final chain, the
pipes rolled and he was injured.
Defendant claimed negligence in two areas on plaintiff's part. First, that he arrived with the load in a condition that was unsafe for unloading. Second, that during unloading, he released the final chain without making
sure that it was safe to do so.
As to its own fault, defendant contended that it had
no duty at all to block during unloading, so that any injury occurring due to improper blocking was plaintiff's
own fault, and not an area where defendant had duties
or could be found negligent.
'Ve wish to analyze the court's opinion to find where
the misunderstanding arose. The starting point for clarification should be analysis of the significance of the
jury's finding that the defendant was negligent.
If the jury accepted defendant's contention that it
had no duty to block during unloading, the jury would
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not have found the defendant negligent at all. There
must be a duty for there to be negligence. An act which
should be done, and is done improperly or omitted altogether, constitutes such negligence. The jury was
properly instructed on this point. ( R. 59, 60). It found
that the defendant was negligent. We may therefore
conclude that the jury found that the defendant did have
the duty to block. Defendant did not attack this finding
on appeal.
Defendant had also contended that plaintiff in1pulsively proceeded to unchain without clearing with
defendant, or giving defendant time or opportunity to
do whatever blocking it might have done. Query: If this
contention were accepted by the jury, how could it have
found defendant negligent?
As in all things, some doubt is possible. 'Vhen plaintiff says that the jury had to base its findings on rejection of these contentions, it is possible that there was
some other factor. However, the only basis of a finding
of negligence against defendant that had evidence to
support it or that was urged by plaintiff, or that went
to the jury in instructions of the court, was that def enrlant had the duty to block the pipe safely during unloading, and breached that duty.
The court's confusion might have been caused in
part by defendant. Defendant's brief starts out by saying, "The verdict in this case was that plaintiff was negligent." (Page 2). It reads in that light, plaintiff's negligence, throughout. The court is invited to re-read that
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brief, to see if even one sentence of it acknowledges that
defendant was found negligent too, or one statement of
fact as to how that occurred. The statement of facts is
that of the pure winner against the pure loser, and this
might be the cause of confusion of the appellate court.
Now, we can go to the issue of plaintiff's negligence.
It might be that the jury found that he should have visually checked the blocking before unchaining. However,
defendant also contended repeatedly that plaintiff was
negligent in arriving with the load unblocked, and with
only one belly wrap and with that placed in the center of
the load. Defendant contended that the blocking should
have been on, and adequate, when plaintiff arrived. In
regard to the chaining, it is factually agreed that plaintiff had two outer chains over the entire load of pipe, and
a third chain-the belly wrap-as an inner chain. Defendant said there should have been two belly chains, not
centered, but at either end of the load, so that plaintiff
would have been able to stand clear of the pipe when he
undid them. It is entirely possible that the jury verdict
may he based on these claims. These were not just casual claims. Defendant pressed one or both of them on all
11 \vitnesses who dealt with trucking, (plaintiff, his codriver, defendant's three employees, and the six truckers
called as expert witnesses) .
Thus defendant did all it could to claim and prove
'
negligence on plaintiff's part before he ever arrived in
the Salt Lake City yard.
Here we have the reason why the analysis of de-
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fendant's negligence is important. There is a point where
the chains must be undone to unload, leaving the pipe
free to roll, unless proper blocking holds the pipe safely. '
The jury found that defendant had the duty to block
during unloading. If it performed this duty properly,
what difference would it make how many blocks or
chains were on the load when it arrived at the Salt Lake
City yard? If defendant did its duty of blocking during
unloading properly, what plaintiff did before then is
antecedent conduct, and not the legal proximate cause of
the accident. This is the key fact. Unfortunately, it is
omitted from the court's opinion.
Counsel suspects that the court started into an anal·
ysis of duty,
of the opinion), but then left it because
analysis of the defendant's duty seemed unimportant, in
view of the fact that plaintiff admittedly didn't visually
check the blocking before he undid the chain. The cause
of this limited mention of duty in the opinion may be its
statement at paragraph three, that when plaintiff
climbed onto the truck to undo the chain," ... he partially
released it, but the pipes did not move, so he applied ad·
ditional force." This, if correct, would indicate an almost
reckless disregard for safety on plaintiff's part, so that
a detailed analysis of duty could seem unnecessary.

i

To correct this view, in fact, when plaintiff climbed
onto the truck, the belly wrap was lying slack. He re·
leased it without any effort, and never applied additional
force. Mr. Murray, defendant's yard foreman, testified
that plaintiff just "flipped" the binder handle up (R. :
451, Lll-16). The release though, was only step one of a

1

!
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two-step safety feature of the belly wrap, and both steps
had to be taken for the pipe to be free to roll. Step one
was lifting the binder handle to an upright position; the
handle locks in a down position. When it is put into an
upright position several inches are added to the length of
the chain. This can be visualized. Hold a pencil upright,
,,ertically, in front of you. Imagine that a chain coming
from the left is attached to its top. Another chain comes
from the right, and attaches to the bottom of the pencil.
Now lay the top of the pencil down, to the right, without
moving the bottom. It can be seen that this tightens the
chain by a few inches. This is the first, or safety step of
the binder. It travels locked down. It is moved upright
during unloading. If it moves upright easily, and the few
inches of chain thus made available are not drawn taut
by the load it secures, then it is obvious that the load is
held in place by something else, such as blocks. The second step is then taken. Slip the chains off the top and
bottom of the pencil, and whatever is under the chains
can now be removed. This equates exactly to removing
the hooks at either end of the binder, from the chains
which come up from opposite sides of the truck bed.
This is illustrated on page 8 of plaintiff's brief.
Now, go back a step. The four small pipes that were
pyramided in the middle of the load were small only in
comparison to the other pipe. The small pipes were steel,
10 inches in diameter, and 16 to 22 feet long. Each of
them weighed 750 to 1,000 pounds. Together the four
of them weighed as much as a heavy passenger car. The
fact was well established in the trial that pipe roll freely,
7

exerting pressure in all directions consistent with gravity. Two of the four small pipe were stacked one above
the other, and both of them were over the junction where
the other two pipe met. Their force was downward, of
course, but it was also outward. 1,500 to 2,000 pounds
pushing down between two other pipes will seek to settle
in between them. This will force the two pipes beneath
them apart. This is illustrated on page 6 of plaintiff's
original brief. This also illustrates plaintiff's contention
at the trial that he did in fact check for blocking, but that
he used what he considered the best method. He got on
top of the load, he asked if it was safe to undo the chains,
and was told yes. That is disputed, but is his contention.
What is important is that he followed what he felt to be
the true way of checking adequate blocking; that is, to
watch the end of the job he was responsible for-his
chains. If they remained slack when he put the handle
upright, then he knew the blocking was good. If the
blocking had not been adequate, the pipe would have
moved out, and taken up the few inches of slack thus
produced.
It may be that he should have also visually checked
the blocking. However, his course had valid reasons and
conformed to trade customs. This point is made in some
detail, so the court will not think him so negligent that it
deals with the case on a kind of negligence per se basis.
Also, as indicated in Sticlde v. Pacific R. Co., 122 Utah
447, 251P.2d867, a quite similar case, a person has some
right to rely on the proper performance of duty by another.
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The court might wonder why the pipe rolled at all,
if it didn't move out when the binder handle was lifted
up. All of the points covered in this petition were covered in the original brief, but seemingly not with adequate clarity. On this topic, plaintiff had testified that
after he set the binder handle upright, he then leaned out
to reach the binder hook. He had to stand on the pipe to
reach the binder. Reaching for the hook shifted his
weight outward on the pipe, and was movement tending
to overcome inertia. The experts agreed that on this
factual situation, there was one obvious explanation. The
blocks were in place, but not seated firmly enough
against the pipe. They held the pipe until plaintiff moved
and shifted his weight. Then they slid, and the pipe followed.
To return now to the key point, the defendant was
found by the jury to have the duty to block the pipe.
Now, if plaintiff was negligent in his manner of blocking or chaining before he arrived at defendant's Salt
Lake City yard, of what consequence is it? Would that
not be antecedent negligence in the truest sense of the
term 1 If defendant had met its duty there would be no
injury. It seeks to excuse itself by saying that if plaintiff had performed his prior duty, there would also be
no injury, so it is plaintiff's fault. Antecedent cause is
distinguished from concurring cause by the fact situation-that is if the second actor has a genuine, known,
opportunity to avert the hazard. If so, "he who fails in
this cannot justly charge the ills that follow to the antecedent and remote fault of another, albeit such remote
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fault supplies the condition without which the injury
would not have occurred." Gorman-Garnill Drug Co. v.
Watkins, 64 So. 350, 185 Ala. 653, cited at page 33,
plaintiff's brief. Hillyard v. Utah Byproducts Co., 1
U.2d 143, 263 P.2d 287, at 292. McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 U.2d 400, 403, 346 P.2d 711.
Instruction 19 tells the jury that if plaintiff was
negligent,"- .. in any respect claimed by the defendant,"
and this negligence, " ... contributed in any degree to
cause the accident," and the negligence itself can be in
any degree (paraphrase), then plaintiff was to be found
contributorily negligent. ( T. 62) .
At paragraph 8 of the court's opinion, it starts to
deal with the problems in this instruction. However,
after commenting on the misleading, but not prejudicial,
effect of the negligence phrasing, the court drops the
point. However, plaintiff's brief conceded that the "any
degree" test for negligence is not error per se (plaintiff's brief, p. 26) . The brief only contends that it aggravates, and accumulates, the other errors in the instruction. The opinion does not deal at all with the phrase
that says negligence that contributes in any degree to
causation is contributory negligence, nor with the phrase
that says plaintiff can be found negligent, "in any way
claimed by defendant." Plaintiff's brief has citations
that it is error to submit a blanket, non-specific theory
of negligence to a jury. The ways in which a party is
claimed negligent should be set out with precision, or the
jury might find negligence on an improper basis. There
are also citations in the brief that while negligence is sub-
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ject to an "any degree" test, an "any degree" test of
proximate cause is prejudicial error (plaintiff's brief p.
27-34) . It must be substantial, effective and uninterrupted. On the fact situation as given in the opinion, this
omission of discussion is understandable. Proximate
cause need not be discussed if it is not a real, factual
issue. So too, the claims of a party as a general statement,
may not be improper if there is only one. However, in
this case the party had multiple claims, and proximate
cause is a real issue.
In view of the fact that the opinion states that plaintiff only, "removed part of the blocks," (paragraph 2),
before leaving Arizona, thus giving the impression that
the court felt plaintiff was at least jointly responsible
for any blocking defects, plaintiff wishes to finish up
with a few remarks about blocking. This, too, was covered in his brief, but flatly denied in defendant's, and the
record left obscured. The truck was loaded in defendant's yard in Arizona. Only 4 x 4 blocking was available
there. This could not be secured adequately to the trailer
bed. The 42-inch pipe curved out at such a low angle
that it would be difficult to drive nails deeply through
the blocks into the trailer bed. If this were not done, the
blocks could be loosened by the motion of the load on the
trip to Salt Lake. An eight-foot long 4 x 4 would be a
considerable road hazard if it came off the truck. Accordingly, plaintiff secured the load well with chains
and remoyed the blocks that had been put in place temporarily to hold the pipe during loading. Carl Adkins,
plaintiff's co-driver, affirmed this.
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Defendant called no one from its Arizona yard tu
rebut.
Defendant's own witnesses agreed that such blocking would not be roadworthy. One of defendant's witnesses said that proper blocking would be 8 x 8 "cradle''
blocking. That is, blocks curved on the surface that met
the pipe, to conform to the shape of the pipe, and large
enough to be firmly nailed to the truck bed notwithstanding the pipe overhang. Defendant supplied no such
blocking. On arrival in Salt Lake, defendant, through its
three yard men, said the load was blocked on its east
side by one nailed-down eight foot 4 x 4. On the west side,
where the pipe rolled, they said there was no block on the
truck, and no block on the ground anywhere near the
truck. However, the deputy sheriff who was called to the
scene found an eight foot 4 x 4 block on the ground at
the west side of the trailer. He said it had no nails. This,
obviously, was the block that slid. Also, obviously, it
would not survive the 500-mile trip from Flagstaff just
sitting on the truck bed with no nails, so it had to have
been put on in the Salt Lake yard. One of defendant's
men, Mr. Lopez, after testifying that there were no
blocks on the ground on the west side of the truck, admitted that in his deposition he had said that there were.
He refused to admit that statement was true, but did
admit that he swore to it in his deposition, and gave no
explanation for his change of position. Mr. Murray, defendant's foreman, likewise admitted he had sworn in his
deposition that blocks were on the ground there.
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In regard to the single nailed-down block that defendant's three men testified was on the east side of the
trailer when it arrived, each of the three men admitted to
grave contradictions on cross examination, as follows:
Kent Thomas backed up, and said that he examined the
block carefully and noticed no nails in it himself, but
testified that there were nails in it only because he was
told that there were by Mr. Murray (who was the yard
foreman, a partner in defendant company, and his boss).
Thus 1\1-r. Thomas actually supported plaintiff's contention that the blocks were placed by defendant, as his
actual observation of no nails in the block indicated that
it had not made the trip. Second, Mr. Lopez, the yard
laborer, after first testifying on direct that after the accident he saw a single nailed-down block on the east side,
admitted that in his deposition he swore there were several blocks there and he also saw no nails. He finally admitted in his testimony that he actually saw no nails
either. He then testified that all he saw when he inspected the block was what he took to be hammer dents in the
wood, but no nails. Finally, Mr. Murray clung firmly to
his story that there was a single nailed-down block, and
that he remembered it vividly because he removed it
personally with a crowbar. He would not give up this
position, but did admit that in his deposition he swore
that there was a row of blocks, not just one, on the east
side, and that he personally removed none of them. He
gaye no explanation for these discrepancies.
There is a logical explanation for these discrepancies. Assume these to be the facts-Mr. Lopez placed a
13

row of blocks along the east side of the truck. They held
when the chains were undone. On the west side, he got
lazy and placed only one block. This didn't create enough
traction to hold, but allowed the pipe to fall when the
pressure got great enough. The defendant made up a
"story" to cover the matter. The story is that plaintiff
nailed a single block on each side of the load in Arizona
'
but one fell off enroute. One block on each side is deemed
suitable, because a series of blocks on each side would not
all fall off during the trip. He unchained in Salt Lake,
but because one block was missing the pipe is loose, rolls
and he was hurt. All his own fault.
The trouble is that the story was made up after the
depositions were taken. Mr. Thomas was not a party to
the story and that is why, while he gives the story at the
start, he admits that he personally inspected and saw no
nailed block, and readily admits it is only what Mr. Murray told him. :Mr. Murray sticks to the story, but can't
explain why, if he remembers so acutely his crowbarring
the block off the east side, he said unequivocally in his
deposition that he didn't remove any block from the east
side. Neither Mr. Murray nor Mr. Lopez can explain
why they both deposed that there were a number of
blocks on the ground on the west, the accident side of the
truck. None of them can explain why the officer who investigated found an unnailed block on the ground right
by the truck on the west side. None of them can explain
why, if the west side of the load was unblocked, the
binder was free of the constant pressure the pipe exerted.
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It is submitted that the assumed set of facts might
well be true because they explain the entire testimony,
where defendant's explanations do not.

As a final point to be made when the court weighs
the facts, defendant's brief states, and the court's opinion
indicates, that it was plaintiff's duty to block the pipe
during unloading. Mr. Murray admitted that these questions and answers from his deposition were accurate:
"Q. - Other than unchaining the load and positioning the truck, his responsibility was - the
rest of the responsibility was yours and your employees.
"A. -

Yes, that is right.

"Q. - And do you assume responsibility for
the supervision of the direction of the unloading
of the pipe?
"A. -Yes." (R. 477, L22-488, L14).

Except for defendant's own three men, every witness in the case, including defendant's expert witnesses,
agreed that it was the yard's responsibility to supply
blocking and to supervise unloading. Some of them said
they would check the blocking visually before unchai11;ing, but as to the duty to block, there was no disagreement.
It is recognized that a witness is not necessarily impeached by proof of prior conflicting deposition testimony. Here though, as the jury found defendant negligent, it must be that in fact the jury did find defendant's
claims were effectively impeached.
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A jury is presumed to follow instructions. Williams
v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co., 119 Utah 529
230 P.2d 315.
,
The problem in the instruction on proximate cause
in general, ( R. 53) , is that it is in fact general, and so is
modified by the specific instruction that "any degree"
of proximate cause suffices for contributory negligence.
( R. 62, Instruction 19) . What is any degree of proximate cause?
It could be any act without which an accident might
not occur, no matter how interrupted or unsubstantial.
Unsubstantial proximate cause is illustrated by the famous comment, "For want of a nail, a shoe was lost. For
want of a shoe, a horse was lost. For want of a horse, a
rider was lost ... etc." The loss of the battle of Hastings
can't be pinned on a single horseshoe nail. Much more
would have to be involved. Under the "any degree" of
proximate cause test, though, the jury can return averdict against the nail. Such a definition, in a case where
proximate cause is a real issue, as in this one, is reversible
error. Hall v. Blackham, 18 U.2d 164, 417 P.2d 664;
Divine v. Cook, 3 U.2d 134, at 145, 279, P.2d at 1073;
Cox v. Thompson, 123 U. 81, 254 P.2d 1047; Rest. of
Torts, Sec. 465 (It is a legally contributing cause of his
harm if, but only if, it is a substantial factor in bringing
a bout his harm.)
In a case where a rule of law is stated correctly, but
also incorrectly, as above, and the rule is important to the

16

decision, the discrepancy is reversible error because it is
impossible to tell which statement the jury followed.
Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 U. 366, at 381, 270 P. 349.

CONCLUSION
In sum, plaintiff's complaint is that the instruction
submits antecedent negligence to the jury, with any
degree of relation between it and causation a bar to plaintiff's recovery. This is error for two reasons. First, being
antecedent, it shouldn't go to the jury at all. Second, if
submission of it to the jury is within discretion of the
trial court, then proximate cause is very much an issue
and the "any degree" test of it is error.
Plaintiff's counsel must confess to a sense of frustration. The trial took four days and the jury was out
for hours. To sum up the conflicting evidence, and interpret it in light of a finding of joint negligence, and
then to argue the law appropriately, was quite a job.
That is why the brief was so long. But it is all in there. All
statements of facts made in this petition have specific
record citations in that brief. It must be though like a
book on philosophy: It might be in there, but it isn't easy
to get it out. By contrast, defendant wrote a brief on the
simple premise that if plaintiff were negligent, that is all
there is to it. To have that simple, precise brief followed
by the court, when the jury obviously rejected most contentions of the defendant, is disheartening. In the future,
counsel will remember that the court has only five jus-
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tices-no more than it had when Utah became a statebut with an obvious change in caseload.
Plaintiff-Appellant moves for a new trial on the
issue of his contributing negligence.
Respectfully submitted,
SAMUEL KING
KING&CRAFT
409 Boston Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for plaintiff.
respondent
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